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
The Evolving Role of the Supreme Soviet in National Security Decision-Making

Kenneth J. Rackers, Capt. USA

CNA

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
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The Evolving Role of the Supreme Soviet in National Security Decision-Making

Kenneth J. Rackers, Capt., USA

Operations and Support Division



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ABSTRACT

The recent, radical movement toward democratization of the political system in the USSR has generated important changes in its legislative organs. This study examines the ongoing restructuring of these bodies, with particular emphasis on the Supreme Soviet and its evolving role in national security decision-making.

A totally new state body, the Congress of People's Deputies, also is analyzed as to its structure, tasks, and responsibilities. From its membership was elected the new Supreme Soviet, which is contrasted with the "old" Supreme Soviet, its history, organization, power, and responsibilities. The shifting sources of legislative power and the changing role of the new and strengthened legislative bodies are discussed.

FOREWORD

The environment in which decision-making for national security affairs is conducted in the Soviet Union is undergoing significant change. General Secretary/President Mikhail Gorbachev's programs of *Glasnost* and *Perestroika* have clearly redefined the milieu in which policies relating to foreign and defense affairs are formulated.

Gorbachev has sought to improve, in particular, the oversight of national security policy planning and implementation. One facet of his program is to vest the revamped Supreme Soviet with powers to permit legislative oversight of Soviet national security institutions. There has been considerable controversy, however, as to whether the Soviet parliament could exercise effective oversight of such powerful entities as the KGB, the armed forces, or the party apparatus. Indeed, as this foreword is being drafted there are many troublesome indications that a rightward shift in the Kremlin may doom the Supreme Soviet's fledgling ability to perform its newly created national security oversight function.

Ken Rackers has examined the evolving role of the Supreme Soviet in an effort to analyze the new structure that has been devised by Gorbachev to check the traditional power of the professional military and the security apparatus. He notes the optimistic expectations of many Soviets for this new body, but also paints a realistic picture of the limitations faced by the Supreme Soviet in exercising the oversight role. The parliament, and particularly its Defense and State Security and International Affairs committees, may prove inadequate to the daunting task assigned to them. Nevertheless, we believe this study provides a valuable look at this key component of Gorbachev's democratization program.

Tyrus W. Cobb
Senior Fellow

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INTRODUCTION

The political system in the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev is undergoing radical changes, actually a "political revolution." Gorbachev's attempts to reinvigorate the country both economically and politically have led him to seek the support and involvement of the people in his program, realizing that their participation is absolutely necessary for the success of his *perestroika*, or restructuring. One result of *perestroika* is Gorbachev's policy of democratization, which is spilling over into all segments of political life, including the national security decision-making process. This was previously the realm of the Communist Party, and its primary agent in this arena, the military.

A key component of the democratization policy is strengthening the system of people's Soviets (local governments) at the expense of the Communist Party's former monopoly of power. At the head of the system of Soviets is the Congress of People's Deputies (CPD) and the standing legislature elected from the CPD, the Supreme Soviet. The growing influence of these quasi-representative legislative bodies ranks among the most significant changes of the Gorbachev regime.

This paper will analyze the evolving role of the Supreme Soviet and its Defense and State Security Committee (DSSC) and International Affairs Committee (IAC) in the Soviet Union's national security decision-making arena. More specifically, the role of the old Supreme Soviet and its pertinent committees will be contrasted with that of the new legislative bodies. An attempt will also be made to explain how and why these changes have occurred. This process will include an examination of the Supreme Soviet's sources of power and authority.

The Old Supreme Soviet¹

Before Gorbachev's initiative for a strengthened legislative body began in 1988, the Supreme Soviet—according to Article 15 of the 1977 Constitution—was the supreme body of state power in the USSR. Yet few Western analysts considered the Supreme Soviet to be a parliament with any real power. Rather, actual power rested in the hands of the Communist Party, especially in its highest organs.²

The Supreme Soviet formerly consisted of 1,517 deputies and was divided into two chambers: the Council (or Soviet) of Unions and the Council of Nationalities, both of equal power. The Council of Unions consisted of 767 deputies elected directly by the people from districts of nearly equal populations. The 750 members of the Council of Nationalities were elected from the various federal and national units

of the USSR—the republics, oblasts, and okrugs. (Appendix A depicts the structure and organization of the Supreme Soviet before the 1988 Constitutional amendments.)

Until recently, the Soviet leadership went to great lengths to ensure that social membership of the Party and members of the government, military, and economic bureaucracies were reflected among the deputies of the Supreme Soviet. Special attention was given to ensuring that the proletariat, women, and other social groups were represented. While there was high turnover in the general membership of the legislature, the prominent leadership of the regime—as exemplified by the CPSU Central Committee—was well represented in the Supreme Soviet from election to election. Central Committee members held nearly all the highest positions of the Supreme Soviet.³

The Supreme Soviet deputies formerly were elected for a term of five years. The legislature normally met twice a year, with each session lasting only a few days. A Presidium and a system of standing commissions carried on the Supreme Soviet's functions between sessions. Just as in all aspects of the Soviet political system, the election of Supreme Soviet members was carefully controlled by the Communist Party. Nomination of the candidates for single-candidate contests and control of the balloting process led to guarantees of election for Party-approved candidates. Party affiliation of the deputies routinely exceeded 70 percent. Deputies were normally elected with a plurality of more than 99 percent.

Theoretically, the constitutional responsibilities of the Supreme Soviet, including those dealing with security and foreign policy, were extensive.⁴ In reality, however, many of the responsibilities and powers were executed by the Council of Ministers, higher party organs such as the Politburo, and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. The Presidium, consisting of 39 members, was “elected” from the Supreme Soviet's membership as its executive body. This organ, composed of many of the top leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), served as the supervising and administrative body of the Supreme Soviet and also functioned as the symbolic (collective) head of state. Peter Vanneman notes that the Presidium had its own constitutional authority, both executive and legislative. The division of theoretical and actual power shared between the two bodies is a subject of scholarly debate.⁵ In practice, the Presidium directed and exercised the prerogatives of the Supreme Soviet on a daily basis, and the Presidium's actions were perfunctorily approved (with almost no debate) by the Supreme Soviet during its biannual sessions. The Supreme Soviet had (as appendix A demonstrates) a number of standing commissions that provided nominal oversight of their area of responsibility.⁶

The relationship between the Supreme Soviet and the CPSU was also complex and not fully delineated. Prior to March 1990, the Soviet Constitution had assigned only a guiding role to the CPSU, but in fact, the personnel of the Politburo and Central Committee held almost every official position in the Supreme Soviet and its Presidium, and no other party or political group not controlled by the CPSU was allowed to exist. This interlocking and overlapping of personnel provided control of the Supreme Soviet by the Communist Party. Vanneman describes the relationship as follows:⁷

Since Party rules require Party members to support the instruction of higher Party organs, these higher Party organs in effect make the policy which is transformed into law by the Supreme Soviet. In a sense, the Supreme Soviet is a parliamentary system with one strong Party and with power in the hands of a strong extra-parliamentary Party.

Thus, the main purpose of the pre-1988 Supreme Soviet appears to have been to impart to the Party-dominated regime a sense of legitimacy based on a façade of legality and political participation by the masses. This system of legitimization, labelled "Leninist Participation,"⁸ required nearly complete voter participation and approval of Party-selected candidates for single-contestant elections, thus severely limiting voter input regarding policy formulation.

The Supreme Soviet historically has fallen short of its claim to authority based on legitimacy and legality. Although the membership was unusually representative of the populace, the government and the Party always possessed a great deal of independence from legislative control. Vanneman finds that legislative initiative was mainly the realm of the Council of Ministers under strict Party control, not that of the bodies or members of the Supreme Soviet.⁹ Any debate over policy appeared to have been worked out under Party auspices before legislation was submitted to the Supreme Soviet. The true nature of the Supreme Soviet was described by one of its members as follows:¹⁰

Previously on the Olympus of the Supreme Soviet, it was quiet, convenient for the leadership, . . . From the first days of its existence, the country's Supreme Soviet found itself under the irresistible pressure of authoritarian regimes that reduced the role of the supreme legislative body to that of a formal appendage to the party apparatus, an impeccably obedient institution that advertised the virtual absence of democracy.

The Old Supreme Soviet and National Security Decision-Making

Under the former system, the legislature possessed, constitutionally, extensive national security policy formulation powers. As in all policy-making areas, these powers were quite limited in practice; the Party elite wielded the real power and the legislature provided "rubber stamp" approval.

An important part of the security-related function of the Supreme Soviet was legitimizing Soviet policy in the international arena.¹¹ However, the legislature's role in foreign and security policy formulation and implementation appeared to be primarily symbolic, ritualistic, and propagandistic.¹² The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, and other governmental organs—all under the guiding hand of the CPSU—held the real power in foreign-policy formulation.¹³ The ceremonial function of the Presidium as head of state was generally exercised by the chairman of the Presidium, who was also a member of the CPSU Politburo and, since 1966, by the General Secretary.

While the authority to assign diplomatic envoys, appoint the high command of the army, and declare war or martial law theoretically rested with the Presidium and its parent body, the Supreme Soviet, these functions actually were the domain of the high Party organs. This reality has been demonstrated by the recent report to the Congress of People's Deputies (CPD) by the chairman of the International Affairs Committee of the Supreme Soviet, condemning what is now acknowledged as the improper and disastrous decision to intervene in Afghanistan in 1979. Responsibility for this fiasco was determined to have rested with Brezhnev, the CPSU General Secretary, and a few of his Politburo cronies.¹⁴

In the past, therefore, the independent power of the Supreme Soviet and its component organs was severely limited. Despite the gradual movement toward legalization and rationalization detected by many Western Sovietologists during the post-Stalinist period, and especially under the Brezhnev regime, the legislative bodies of the Supreme Soviet and its components remained a far cry from the powerful legislative organs of the West, as exemplified by the U.S. Congress or the British Parliament. This was true both for general policy matters and for the domain of national security decision-making. Genuine parliamentary debate over national security issues appears to have been nonexistent, despite the considerable formal authority of the Supreme Soviet.¹⁵ At best, the Supreme Soviet held policy confirmation authority, as opposed to decision-making power. Thus, the Soviet claim that the Supreme Soviet has been the supreme organ of state power is difficult for Western

analysts to accept. The façade of Soviet legislative power—to borrow Vanneman's term—appears to have been a "juridical Potemkin village."

The New Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet

At the Nineteenth Communist Party Conference in June 1988, General Secretary Gorbachev called for and received approval for a totally new state body—the Congress of People's Deputies (CPD), which was to elect a restructured Supreme Soviet from among its membership. Establishment of the new legislative organs has been hailed as a huge step toward democratization and rule by law in the USSR. The power of these legislative bodies has since increased significantly, as has their authority, in great part because the election process in the USSR has taken great strides toward becoming truly democratic.

As his time in office as General Secretary has lengthened, Gorbachev has developed a sense that only through increased societal participation "from below" can Soviet society reinvigorate itself. This is the basis for his program of reform under the rubrics of democratization, *glasnost* (openness), and *perestroika*—thus engendering a new and invigorated CPD and Supreme Soviet. A significant component of the reform program involves instituting constitutional limits and rule by law, including a separation of powers, in a system that has traditionally experienced only authoritarian rule.

The Congress of People's Deputies

The CPD was established by constitutional amendments adopted in December 1988, six months after Gorbachev first suggested the concept.¹⁶ The amendments state that the CPD is now the "supreme organ of state power," roughly analogous to the old Supreme Soviet. The amendments assign the following tasks and responsibilities to the CPD in regard to the USSR:¹⁷

- Adopting and amending the Constitution
- Adopting decisions on questions of the nation-state structure within its jurisdiction
- Defining state borders and ratifying border changes between Union republics
- Defining the basic guidelines of foreign and domestic policy

- Ratifying long-range state plans and significant all-Union programs for economic and social development
- Electing the Supreme Soviet, the chairman of the Supreme Soviet, and the first deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet
- Removing and replacing the president "in the event of his violating the USSR Constitution or USSR laws" (requires at least a two-thirds majority of the CPD)¹⁸
- Confirming the chairman of the Council of Ministers, the chairman of the People's Control Committee, the chairman of the Supreme Soviet, the prosecutor general, and the chief state arbiter
- Electing the Constitutional Oversight Committee
- Approving nationwide referenda.

The new CPD holds biannual sessions that are intended to last only a few days each. The CPD adopts laws and resolutions by approval of at least half the total number of deputies; constitutional amendments require at least a two-thirds approval of the CPD membership.

The CPD consists of 2,250 members who are elected once every five years. (See appendix B for details on the structure of the new legislative organs.) Certain officials, including government ministers, cannot serve as deputies to the CPD or the Supreme Soviet. Deputies are restricted to two five-year terms but are subject to recall at any time by a majority of constituents from the *okrug* (electoral district) or the organization that elected them.

Fifteen hundred of the deputies are chosen according to territorial and national criteria similar to the pre-1988 procedure for the Supreme Soviet. The other 750 members are selected from official organizations such as the CPSU; trade unions; and cooperative, youth, women's, veterans', and scientific organizations. These groups include only the "official" organizations, which are historically Party dominated, and not the nearly 30,000 *neformaly* (informal, non-CPSU-affiliated groups) that have surfaced in recent years.¹⁹ The CPSU was therefore guaranteed a monopoly of power in the first round of elections to this new and more powerful legislature.

The Supreme Soviet

The restructured Supreme Soviet holds two three- to four-month sessions each year in spring and fall. Listed below are the responsibilities of the Supreme Soviet most germane to the USSR's national security issues or its ability to perform in that arena:²⁰

- Scheduling elections of people's deputies and ratifying the composition of the Central Electoral Commissions
- Confirming the chairman of the Council of Ministers, ratifying the composition of the Council of Ministers as nominated by the president, and creating or abolishing ministries and state committees
- Confirming the composition of, and appointments to, the supreme command of the armed forces
- Holding regular hearings on the performance of those bodies and officials appointed or elected by the Supreme Soviet
- Possessing the right to express a vote (by a two-thirds majority) of no confidence in the Council of Ministers, thereby requiring its resignation²¹
- Implementing legislative regulations governing the budget and financial system, taxation, and the use of natural resources
- Ratifying or nullifying prior international treaties
- Determining basic measures to be undertaken or continued in defense and state security matters, including proclaiming full or partial mobilization or a state of war in the event of an armed attack on the USSR, or the need to meet international treaty obligations; and deciding the deployment of armed forces if needed to meet international treaty obligations
- Possessing the right to revoke resolutions and orders of the Council of Ministers (but not those of the president, if they are constitutional).

The Supreme Soviet is bicameral; that is, each chamber has 271 members elected from the CPD (appendix B provides details as to the structure of the Supreme Soviet and its relationship to the CPD) and is constitutionally subordinate

to the CPD. It cannot adopt any laws or other legislation contrary to those of the CPD. Yet by setting the agenda for the biannual sessions of the CPD, and by making laws or drafting constitutional amendments, it has great power and authority relative to the CPD. Given its responsibilities and prerogatives, and considering it is in session six to eight months each year (compared to a few days each session for the CPD), the Supreme Soviet is certainly the more important of the two bodies.

The Chairman of the Supreme Soviet

The Chairman of the Supreme Soviet is also chairman of the CPD. He is roughly equivalent to the speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives. He heads the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and has significant responsibilities and prerogatives concerning the functioning and organization of the legislative organs that he chairs. Gorbachev, the former chairman, used these powers effectively to determine which deputies spoke and for how long, and by so doing, he was often able to control which issues were addressed during legislative sessions. He also was able to control much of the agenda of the Supreme Soviet and the CPD.²²

The chairman is entitled to sit in on meetings of the newly created Presidential Council²³ and is first in line of succession for the presidency, should the president not be able to perform his duties.²⁴ The present Supreme Soviet chairman is Anatoly Lukyanov, who was elected after Gorbachev became president.²⁵

The Presidium

The Presidium includes the chairman and two deputy chairmen of each of the two chambers, the chairmen of the standing commissions (8) and committees (14), people's deputies—one from each union republic (15), two each from other autonomous republics, and one each from other autonomous oblasts and okrugs.²⁶

The Presidium, consisting of 47 members and headed by the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, is responsible for preparing for sessions of the CPD and Supreme Soviet, convening sessions of those bodies, and coordinating the work of the standing committees and commissions. It ensures that laws adopted by Soviets of subordinate republics and oblasts are constitutional.

The Presidium acts in place of the CPD and Supreme Soviet when the latter are not in session. It can enact legislation and declare mobilization or a state of war—subject to the subsequent approval of the Supreme Soviet and the CPD. The Presidium

has legislative, executive, and judicial powers; however, its executive powers have recently been reduced with the establishment of the Executive Presidency.

Supreme Soviet Committees and Commissions

The Supreme Soviet has established a set of 14 standing committees with oversight of certain ministries and functions of the government. Each chamber has a number of commissions that are responsible for oversight of their corresponding ministries and functions of government. (See appendix C for a list of the committees and commissions.) Committee and commission chairmen are members of the Supreme Soviet Presidium. Fifty percent of the membership on these committees and commissions comes from the Supreme Soviet, and 50 percent from those deputies to the CPD not seated in the Supreme Soviet.

This study's focus is primarily on the Defense and State Security Committee (DSSC), and secondarily, on the International Affairs Committee (IAC). The duties of these two committees mirror the constitutional responsibilities of the Supreme Soviet concerning defense and national security policy.

The DSSC performs the initial work on security-related issues for the Supreme Soviet. Its responsibilities include oversight of the armed forces, military preparedness, the military production industry, and the security apparatus. Its functions include writing or reviewing draft legislation, and making recommendations to the Supreme Soviet on appointments to top ministerial positions. Nominees to top Defense Ministry positions must appear before the committee for confirmation hearings.

The IAC, like the DSSC, is composed of 43 members. Its major responsibilities are oversight of the foreign-policy apparatus, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the diplomatic service. The IAC functions as the Supreme Soviet's agent in the foreign affairs arena and thus performs functions similar to those of the DSSC within its area of competence. Some responsibilities of the two committees overlap, particularly in the area of treaty review.

An examination of the committees and commissions of the Supreme Soviet (appendix C) reveals that several of these organs have the potential to influence national security issues. One of these groups is the Planning, Budget, and Finance Commission of the Council of the Union. However, an examination of the other committees and their roles is beyond the scope of this study. In addition, because of the recent changes in the Supreme Soviet, procedures for coordinating the various committees' activities remain incomplete.

The Executive Presidency²⁷

On 13 March 1990, the CPD approved a package of constitutional amendments that included creation of the position of a Western-style Executive Presidency. On 14 March, Mikhail Gorbachev was elected to that post by an extraordinary session of the CPD for a five-year term; on 15 March, Gorbachev was sworn in as the first President of the USSR.²⁸ After the first term, the president will be popularly elected. The new president has sweeping powers that include the following:

- A legislative veto that can only be overturned by a two-thirds majority in each chamber of the Supreme Soviet.
- The right to declare a state of emergency and institute temporary presidential rule. (However, the president must first attempt to secure the local authority's approval. If the approval is not forthcoming, the Supreme Soviet must ratify the decision by a two-thirds majority.)
- The right to nominate the chairmen of the Council of Ministers, the People's Control Committee, the Supreme Court, the Prosecutor General, the Chief State Arbiter, and the individual governmental ministers—all subject to confirmation by the Supreme Soviet. The president can make representations to dismiss these officials (with the exception of the chairman of the Supreme Court, because he will have jurisdiction over interpretation of the constitutionality of the president's actions and decrees) to the Supreme Soviet, which must approve the dismissals.
- The right to dissolve the Supreme Soviet, but only in the case of irreconcilable differences between the two chambers.
- The right to issue decrees and to suspend operation of the Council of Ministers' resolutions and instructions.
- The right to hold talks with foreign governments and organizations and sign international treaties; to appoint and recall diplomatic representatives; and to confer the highest diplomatic rank and titles.
- The right to grant or withdraw Soviet citizenship.
- As commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the right to appoint and replace the supreme army high command and confer the highest military ranks.²⁹

- The right to declare general or partial mobilization or a state of war in the event of a military attack on the USSR (subject to approval by the Supreme Soviet).
- The right to declare martial law in particular localities in the interest of defense of the USSR and the security of its citizens (evidently not subject to required approval by the CPD or Supreme Soviet; however, this procedure is to be determined by law).

Some of the powers of the new presidency were previously vested with the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet; however, the new position has more comprehensive powers than those of the chairman prior to March 1990. The emergency, veto, martial law, and war powers are all considerable enhancements of the executive authority of the new head of state. The powers of the new Soviet presidency are partially based on those of the presidents of the United States and France.³⁰

In addition to the new presidency, two new bodies were created to advise the president, both headed by the president. The first, the Council of the Federation, comprises the "supreme state officials" of the 15 union republics. This Council examines questions of compliance with the union treaty, ensures "participation in resolving questions of unionwide significance," and also deals with inter-ethnic relations. The Chairman of the Supreme Soviet and the chairmen of each of its chambers are entitled to take part in the sitting of the Council of the Federation.

The second consultative body is the Presidential Council, which is tasked to "elaborate measures to implement the main directions of the USSR's domestic and foreign policy and ensure the country's security." The members of the Presidential Council are appointed solely by the president, except for the chairman of the Council of Ministers, who is a member *ex officio*. The chairman of the Supreme Soviet has the right to participate in sittings of the Presidential Council. Some members of the new Council may have been appointed for the political purpose of ensuring a wide representation, rather than because Gorbachev values their counsel. However, one analyst has concluded that the Presidential Council is becoming the most significant executive body of the USSR, replacing the CPSU Politburo and assuming direction of, or replacing, the Defense Council.³¹

DISCUSSION

What then is the role of the new and strengthened legislative organs in Soviet national security decision-making? How has this role changed relative to the former

parliamentary system that had little real power? What are the sources of any enhanced power and authority in security policy formulation? These questions require closer examination to determine the extent of the new legislative system's power in security policy formulation in relation to the other major players of the Soviet political system.

The establishment and early record of the CPD, the Supreme Soviet, and its committees and commissions—together with an increase of legislative authority and commitment to rule by law—suggest that these legislative organs are beginning to have considerable power to determine policy in all aspects of Soviet political life, including security policy.

Sources of Legislative Power and Authority

Before going further with a discussion of the authority and powers of Soviet legislative organs, it may be useful to review the traditional sources of legislative influence. The U.S. Congress and its levers in the security policy formulation process will be examined as a model.³²

Traditionally, legislatures have several key powers and prerogatives to influence foreign and security policy. These include the following:

- Legislative jurisdiction—the ability to make laws affecting foreign and defense policy.
- The “power of the purse”—the authority to raise revenues and authorize and appropriate funds for national defense, foreign policy, and foreign aid. (In the United States, this authority includes the stipulation that the executive branch spend the appropriated funds for the intended purpose as required by the Anti-Deficiency Act.)³³
- The specialized prerogative to authorize international agreements, e.g., postal, patent, and copyright agreements.
- The power of “advice and consent,” for treaty ratification. (In the case of the U.S. Congress this power is vested with the Senate.)
- War powers—the power to authorize or constrain the executive branch's ability to wage war.

- Arms transfers—the authority through legislation to monitor military sales and assistance, including disapproval power, as well as legislated reporting requirements and control of the uses of appropriations for these purposes.
- Oversight—the power of legislative investigation, an accepted and influential method to ensure parliamentary influence and informed lawmaking (in the United States principally through use of the General Accounting Office, which in turn spurs preemptive Inspector General investigations by the Executive Branch).
- Confirmation—the power to approve the appointments of ministers, consuls, ambassadors, and military officers.

Some of these powers and responsibilities are granted to the U.S. Congress by the Constitution; others have developed through the give-and-take of the political process that has occurred over time between the Congress and the Executive Branch, but are derived from the constitutional power of Congress to legislate. The Soviet Constitution would appear to grant these, and perhaps even more specific, powers to the CPD and the Supreme Soviet. A legislature generally can influence security policy by these and other powers, both explicit and implied. The intelligence oversight function performed by U.S. legislative organs following World War II is one such explicit power that stems from the constitutional authority to legislate.³⁴

Less tangible is the power to influence based on the authority of a popularly elected representative body. The “advice and consent” clause, backed up by the image of legislators as representatives of the people, grants influence in policy formulation. One frequent use of the “advice and consent” power by the U.S. Senate in the security arena has been to declare both binding and nonbinding resolutions intended to influence executive-branch policy.

This prerogative coincides with the Congress’s authority to subject an issue to public debate. The phenomenon of merely exposing security issues to public awareness and debate offers significant, but often immeasurable, opportunities for legislative influence—as the Soviet defense establishment is finding out. Such activity might be termed the power of persuasion. This public exposure provides opportunities for influence and is used by the U.S. Congress, or individual members thereof, to influence government policy.

Another factor in the ability of a legislature to influence security policy is resource availability. Key to a robust performance of legislative analysis and oversight

functions are access to information (including classified material), expertise in the security policy arena, and provision of other basic resources such as a staff of specialists, office space, and materials. It is in this arena that the U.S. Congress is perhaps the best-equipped legislature in the world. Congressmen have their own staffs; the average Senator's staff in 1976 was 31 persons.³⁵ Committee staffs also are large and influential. In addition, the Congress has access to information through the Congressional Research Service, the Office of Technology Assessment, the General Accounting Office (GAO), and the Congressional Budget Office.

The GAO alone has a staff of 2,000 employees who oversee and audit federal government programs and operations domestically and abroad.³⁶ The GAO and other congressional staff organizations provide Congress with the information and resources necessary to enforce its legislative requirements and prerogatives. Congressional staffs do much of the work of the U.S. Congress and considerably enhance the ability of Congress to challenge the executive branch in all areas, including the security policy and foreign-affairs arena. The House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) and its subcommittees have a staff of 100; the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) has a staff of 66.³⁷

While large staffs and access to resources, especially information, offer great potential for legislative policy influence, these factors also make legislative power diffuse. The staffs themselves gain tremendous influence, while the individual legislator is often swamped with the various demands and the great number and complexity of issues competing for attention. Another factor complicating the role of legislators is the proliferation of committees and subcommittees with oversight interest in the same area. The HFAC, the HASC, the Appropriations Committee, and their Senate counterparts, as well as several others, often have common oversight interests that require cooperation and bargaining among the committees.

Thus, legislative oversight and participation is ensured in U.S. foreign and national security policy-making, often to the dismay of the executive branch. Unlike some parliamentary systems, where the government is formed from the legislature, the U.S. system of separate branches of government results in competition and tension between these two branches, thus complicating the development of a coherent foreign and national security policy.³⁸ However, this same phenomenon also ensures that these policies are formulated openly and are generally representative of the public will.

The above discussion of legislative oversight and participation in national security policy formulation provides a framework for analyzing the fledgling role of

the Soviet legislative bodies in this arena. With this framework in mind, the answers to the following questions should provide evidence as to the power and influence of the Soviet legislature in national security decision-making: Is the Supreme Soviet/CPD the sole source of funding for the Soviet foreign policy and national security apparatus? Does the Supreme Soviet have the power and resources to enforce its legislation? If the Soviet legislative bodies do not yet have the power to enforce their prerogatives, will the establishment of the present institutions enable the Soviet legislature to develop the influence and power? What is the current status of executive-legislative relations (cooperative or competitive)?

The Move Toward Democracy

The elections to the CPD in the spring of 1989 marked the first countrywide multicandidate secret-ballot elections held in the Soviet Union since 1917. This is not to say that they were completely democratic. The "one person, one vote" principle was violated by the reservation of one-third of the seats to the CPD for members of official organizations. Also, a significant number of candidates ran unopposed.³⁹

Despite these shortcomings, however, the claim to authority based on these popular elections seems to have conferred enhanced power and authority on the Soviet legislative organs. A clear demonstration of this enhanced power was the rejection of several nominees to the Council of Ministers and the questioning of others in an often hostile manner by the Supreme Soviet.

Gorbachev has positively assessed the work of the "enhanced" Supreme Soviet, calling the legislature "a solid foundation" for the creation of a "socialist law-governed state, creating the political conditions necessary for combining socialism and democracy and rendering perestroika more irreversible." He further stated that the past practice whereby decisions were adopted by "a narrow circle of people" has ended, and continued by saying:⁴⁰

Political solutions, upon which the country's and the people's destiny depend, will henceforth always be prepared, discussed, and adopted . . . by those chosen by the people, [and] not in closed sessions, but publicly, for all of society to see, and, furthermore, with the very active participation of the Soviet people.

The new legislative organs are significant, but also at times have appeared to be executors of Gorbachev's will. The recent constitutional amendments creating a powerful presidency and amending Article 6 (regarding abolition of the CPSU's

monopoly of power in Soviet political life) are evidence of the legislatures' conformity to the General Secretary's will.⁴¹ However, the abolition of the CPSU monopoly on power may also portend an increased future independence and authority if a multi-party system is engendered. The amendment abolishing the CPSU's monopoly of political power should also enhance the independent powers of the legislative organs. There is substantial evidence to suggest that "popular will" has abandoned the CPSU, offering the opportunity in future elections for escape from absolute Party domination.

The enhanced status of the CPD and the Supreme Soviet has also led to their increased influence in national security policy formulation. The Supreme Soviet is the more important of the two bodies in this respect because it is in session much longer than the few days the CPD meets twice each year.

The Supreme Soviet and the CPD, however, face several obstacles to playing a strong, independent role in the policy arena. One of these obstacles relates to the problem of Party control. The CPSU still dominates the Supreme Soviet: 87 percent of its members are in the CPSU (85 percent for the CPD membership versus 71 percent for the 1984 Supreme Soviet), and 249 of the 542 (46 percent) are leaders of governmental, economic, or official public organizations.⁴² The above figures indicate a substantial increase of Party and governmental *apparatchiki* (bureaucrats) in the new CPD compared to the 1984 Supreme Soviet membership, but a decline in members of the Central Committee and the Central Auditing Commission in the new legislative bodies.

Party control of the selection of candidates to the Supreme Soviet is another factor that impairs the organ's ability to develop an independent security policy. There is no established procedure for selection to the most important legislative organ. How the initial lists for candidates to Supreme Soviet membership were actually formed is unclear, but it is certain that the CPSU played a key role.⁴³

Another factor limiting the independence of the legislative organs is the guarantee of one-third of CPD seats to official organizations that are strictly controlled by the CPSU. However, during its December 1989 convocation, the CPD deleted certain, but not all, provisions of the constitution that guaranteed these seats. Despite the ambiguity, one analyst believes that the guarantee of reserved seats has been abolished and that deputies currently serving in such seats will be ousted in the 1994 elections⁴⁴—a step that will significantly strengthen legislative independence.

This measure, combined with the recent amendment abolishing the CPSU's monopoly, represents an important step toward reducing Party domination of the

legislative organs and enhancing the significance of multicandidate, multiparty popular elections. These achievements offer potential for a strengthened role in security policy formulation by the legislative organs but offer no guarantee, in view of the historically weak role of Soviet legislative organs in this arena.

The Role of the Defense and State Security Committee

The DSSC and its role have received considerable attention in the Soviet Union as well as in this country.⁴⁵ The DSSC seems to have been modeled after its U.S. counterpart, the House Armed Services Committee (HASC). Members of the HASC and DSSC have met and exchanged information. Soviet legislators have visited the HASC in Washington and have said they wished to introduce practices used by the U.S. Congress into the Supreme Soviet.⁴⁶ Marshal Akhromeyev has testified before the HASC and Admiral Crowe, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has testified before the DSSC.⁴⁷ At this point, however, the fledgling committee is far from having achieved the influence of the HASC and its Senate counterpart.⁴⁸

The DSSC consists of 43 members, the vast majority of whom are members of the military-industrial-security apparatus. Twenty-one are members of the Supreme Soviet, representing 11 different republics; 25 deputies are from the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic (RSFSR). Thirteen of the members were elected to the CPD by seven of the official organizations—six deputies alone from CPSU organs. The Committee includes Obkom first secretaries, KGB officials, general designers (*generalnie konstruktory*), general directors, lathe operators, academicians, and writers. There are six military members on the committee,⁴⁹ including Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, former chief of the Soviet General Staff and a close adviser to Gorbachev; and General Vitaly Shabanov, Deputy Minister of Defense (see appendix D: Members of the Defense and State Security Committee). There is also at least one member, Lieutenant Colonel Viktor Podziruk, from the radical reformist Interregional Group of the CPD. The chairman of the committee, Vladimir Lapygin, a missile-guidance designer, justifies this composition as necessary because of expertise requirements. He discounts the possibility that the committee members will be instruments of the ministries they are tasked to oversee, based on the committee's early record. Lapygin also counters criticism of the character of the committee's membership by using an analogy first provided by Evgenii Primakov, then chairman of the Council of the Union. They both compared excluding military and military production specialists from the DSSC to excluding agricultural experts from the committees concerned with agriculture, asking why amateurs should dominate the process.⁵⁰

The procedure for committee selection remains unclear. Apparently Gorbachev, then chairman of the Supreme Soviet, and the deputy chairman and chairman of the Council of the Union directed the selection process.⁵¹ After nomination of the membership, the Supreme Soviet voted to approve the committee composition, but only after debate and changes in composition, adding a junior officer (Senior Lieutenant N. Tutov).⁵²

Committee chairman Lapygin has spent his career in the defense-aerospace industry and appears unlikely to be a harsh critic of the military-industrial complex. He has stated that the committee's purpose is "reliably ensuring the country's defense capability and security at optimum expenditure."⁵³ Lapygin considers one of the goals of the DSSC to ensure "economic efficiency" as a condition for military expenditures. Increased consumer goods production through conversion of military production facilities is another of Lapygin's priority issues. On a more conservative note, Lapygin has suggested caution in unilaterally cutting the armed forces beyond the 500,000-man cut announced in December 1988, suggesting that further cuts are dependent on American arms reductions.⁵⁴

Lapygin has advocated some ideas that differed from those of the Defense Ministry. He initially favored transition to a professional (all-volunteer) army, but later supported Defense Minister Yazov's position against an all-volunteer army. He supported the higher-education student deferment and release from service approved by the Supreme Soviet, a decision bitterly opposed by the Ministry of Defense.⁵⁵ Lapygin has also pronounced himself an advocate of increased control over the KGB, and called for de-emphasis of the use of force in settling conflicts, and a reduction of secrecy in the security arena. From these statements it would appear that the chairman is not an unquestioning friend of the military and security organs, but is hardly a radical reformer who is likely to institute aggressive legislative control over the military-industrial security organs.

The committee has three subcommittees: one for oversight of defense and the armed services, chaired by Evgenii Velikhov, vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences and director of the Kurchatov Atomic Energy Institute; a second for state security, headed by G. Kharchenko, first secretary of the Zaporozhye Obkom; and the third for oversight of the defense industries, chaired by M. Simonov, general designer of the Sukhoi aircraft-building plant.⁵⁶

Evgenii Velikhov is one of the more prominent members of the committee,⁵⁷ and like Akhromyev, a close adviser to Gorbachev. One analyst attributes to Velikhov the DSSC's success in demanding and subsequently publishing the

"full" (1989) budget of the Ministry of Defense, to include a more comprehensive "line-item" accounting and off-budget military costs, i.e., the military production expenditures that are not part of the Defense Ministry's budget.⁵⁸

The DSSC has also initiated extensive contacts with its U.S. Congressional counterpart, the HASC. The two committees have reached an informal agreement that would invite governmental comment on the opposite country's defense "posture statement." In addition, they have agreed to establish a joint office in Vienna, funded by the Rockefeller Foundation, for the purpose of meeting and discussing questions on their respective military establishments and to exchange other information.⁵⁹

With Akhromeyev, Velikhov, Lapygin and the other military and military-industry and KGB representatives, the committee has the professional, if not the legislative, expertise necessary to perform oversight of this arena. The "preaching to the choir" analogy would, however, appear apt. Given the DSSC membership, "alternative views" differing from those of the ministries may not develop or receive credence if presented by a different group. Georgii Arbatov, a prominent member of the International Affairs Committee, has described the committee membership as a lobby for the military-industrial ministries, rather than an instrument of parliamentary control.⁶⁰ Also, full parliamentary independence and oversight is doubtful as long as the Supreme Soviet members retain their jobs in the ministries and enterprises they are tasked to oversee, rather than becoming full-time legislators.⁶¹

Staff and Resources

The DSSC and all the committees and members of the Supreme Soviet function with a minimum of staff and other types of support. The individual CPD member receives a monthly allowance of 300 rubles, which is intended to pay for the work of staff assistants and secretaries.⁶² This allowance is meager, allowing probably no more than one personal staff assistant. Currently, the DSSC staff is limited to seven;⁶³ however, some staff assistance is available from various ministries and Academy of Science Institutes. The lack of an independent staff, combined with the obligations of the deputies' nonlegislative employment, limits the effectiveness of legislative oversight by the committee.

Other resources such as office space, computer data bases, classified-material storage facilities, and office materials also are in short supply.⁶⁴ The traditional Soviet emphasis on secrecy in security affairs is another negative factor that presents problems for effective legislative oversight. DSSC member S. Golovin has complained that the budget information provided by the Defense Ministry was not

specific and that the report was declared secret.⁶⁵ One American visitor to the DSSC, after asking about committee access to Defense Ministry information, was told that it is obtained by directly petitioning Defense Minister Yazov or Chief of the General Staff Moiseyev. The only method of checking the accuracy of the information received is by "looking for inconsistencies."⁶⁶ Such a method of obtaining information seems to indicate that the Defense Ministry firmly controls what the DSSC receives, and that few mid-level legislative-ministry contacts and relations have developed, further hindering aggressive and effective legislative oversight.

Agenda of the Committee for Defense and State Security

The DSSC and its parent body, the Supreme Soviet, established in the spring of 1989, are still developing their agenda and functions. Committee rules and procedures are in no way established and fully developed like those of the U.S. Congressional committee counterparts. However, members of the DSSC on a visit to the HASC indicated that they intended to deal with the following issues in the next year or so:⁶⁷

- *Law on Defense*—The committee has been reviewing a draft law governing the various components and functions of the Ministry of Defense. This law is to deal with questions of military doctrine and the circumstances of employment of the armed forces (war powers).⁶⁸
- *Law on the KGB*—The committee is reviewing the basic law governing the KGB, describing its duties and powers, as well as its limits.
- *Defense Conversion*—The committee has established a task force to oversee the planning and implementation of conversion of military production facilities to those for production of consumer goods.
- *Defense Budget Review for 1990-91*—The DSSC plans to hold hearings during which the various military services will explain how they intend to spend funds allocated to them. One deputy said the DSSC still does not know how much of the budget went to defense.⁶⁹ The 1991 defense budget is to be reviewed in the fall of 1990, and approved by January 1991.
- *Living Conditions of Servicemen*—Given the serious condition of military and military family living standards, this is an important concern for committee members.

Other agenda matters include further developing committee organization and procedures, arms control issues, and oversight of arms control negotiations. This is an aggressive agenda, especially given the inexperience of the Soviet legislature and the turmoil that the USSR is experiencing. To date, the committee has spent most of its time on the defense budget and war powers laws.⁷⁰

The DSSC is to be congratulated for its first steps toward legislative oversight, but it has much to accomplish before becoming an effective organization similar to its American counterpart. The committee's membership is decidedly biased and subject to conflicts of interest because of the close relationship of most of its members to the ministries that the committee oversees. The committee is being pushed along by more radical members of the Supreme Soviet, including a group of military officers known as the "young turks." This group has submitted a much more liberal draft proposal than the Defense Ministry finds acceptable. Provisions include transition to a smaller, volunteer army, and legislative/civilian control of security policy and expenditures.⁷¹

Role of the International Affairs Committee

The International Affairs Committee (IAC) of the Supreme Soviet has not generated the same degree of interest as the DSSC. This is partially because foreign-policy issues are generally less contentious and usually do not affect as much of society as does the area of competence of the DSSC.

The IAC consists of 43 deputies (see appendix E, Members of the International Affairs Committee) and is chaired by Alexander Dzasokhov, a member of the Supreme Soviet who was not elected as a deputy to that organ or the CPD. This category of Presidium members includes three others besides Dzasokhov, and it formerly included Gorbachev as chairman of the Supreme Soviet. The IAC—as opposed to the DSSC—is made up largely of nonexperts. Thirteen of its members appear to have some degree of security or foreign affairs expertise.⁷² Two members (General Lobov and Admiral Sorokin) are military officers.

The IAC has three subcommittees: foreign policy and legal questions, headed by academician G. Arbatov; foreign economic, scientific, technical, and trade relations chaired by F. Tabeyev, first deputy chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers; humanitarian and cultural relations, chaired by F. Burlatsky, editor and longtime political observer for *Literaturnaya Gazeta*.⁷³

The IAC seems to have a congenial relationship with the USSR's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). Foreign Minister Shevardnadze advocates that the foreign policy formulation process be subject to oversight by the Supreme Soviet, as demonstrated by the following quotation from a survey prepared by the MFA and reported to the Supreme Soviet:⁷⁴

The perestroika and the creation of a rule-of-law state open up possibilities while requiring the establishment of a qualitatively new type of cooperation between the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Foreign Ministry.

... The old forms of cooperation must be given a new and more profound content. There will also be a need for qualitatively renewing and expanding the forms and methods of cooperation in the light of the status of the legislative power and the executive agencies within the rule-of-law state system. The relevant considerations have been put before the International Affairs Committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The survey goes on to stress that the Soviet legislative organs will have the paramount role in directing the country's foreign policy. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, in a different statement, suggests that democratization of the foreign-policy formulation process will prevent such "behind closed doors" decisions as the invasion of Afghanistan.⁷⁵

The congenial relationship between the MFA and the IAC is also demonstrated in the publication of an IAC hearing in which the Deputy Foreign Minister and other MFA officials discussed the role of the IAC in foreign-policy formulation.⁷⁶ The MFA officials offered extensive cooperation between the committee and the Ministry, stressing the need for "democratization" of the policy formulation process. The following individual topics were discussed: establishment of a "reliable legal basis for foreign policy;" IAC involvement in the review of draft treaties and "executive agreements;" periodic reports to the IAC by the MFA on such topics as arms control; and the need for the Supreme Soviet to confirm diplomatic and MFA nominees. Both the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the British Parliamentary process were offered as models for consideration on a range of the above topics. There was some thorough and serious questioning by a number of committee members who seemed determined to strengthen their role in the foreign-policy formulation process.

Despite pledges to allow the Supreme Soviet and the IAC to set the direction of USSR foreign-policy, to date there is little evidence to suggest that Gorbachev,

Shevardnadze, and their close advisers—and to some degree, an enhanced Ministry of Foreign Affairs staff—are not in charge of the recent foreign-policy initiatives of the Soviet Union. So far, the Supreme Soviet and IAC membership seem to agree with the leadership's foreign policy.

CONCLUSIONS

It is apparent that the influence of the Supreme Soviet in national security decision-making has increased significantly, but the legislature is not the primary force behind policy formulation. The move toward democratization, increased openness, and a spirit of accountability to the people tends to promote an increased role for the legislative organs. The seeds of pluralism are beginning to grow, especially with the emerging split of the CPSU into factions such as the Democratic Platform. Another indication of the growth of pluralism is the development of the radical Inter-Regional Group, which has been successful in shaping the development and outcome of a number of important issues, and has demanded and received significant concessions concerning the powers of the Executive Presidency.⁷⁷ Debate on the floor of the Supreme Soviet over such issues as the power and role of the Executive Presidency, contentious questioning of governmental nominees—including rejection of some candidates—and the growing popularity of certain legislators all seem to indicate that the Soviet legislative bodies are becoming more powerful in determining national security policy. The concepts of legislative oversight and constitutional accountability are beginning to take hold.

However, negative factors are retarding the development of legislative influence. These factors include the traditional weakness of legislative organs and the lack of accountability that has existed in Soviet and Russian historical experience. Despite abolition of the Communist Party's monopoly of political power, the CPSU retains more than 87 percent of the seats in the Supreme Soviet; Party members remain, for now, subject to "democratic centralism." The current crisis situation of the Soviet economy and ethnic turmoil are hindering the development of authority of any type, including that of the legislative organs.

It is difficult to determine if the legislative organs of the USSR currently have the enforcement powers required to ensure a strong role in formulating security policy. However, the constitution does grant budgetary and oversight powers to the legislative organs. The recent constitutional amendments also provide the Supreme Soviet with the authority to dismiss the Council of Ministers. The Supreme Soviet's power over the presidency is more limited, but the president is accountable to the CPD. The president has the right to issue binding decrees—but he does not have

the authority to change or override the laws of the Supreme Soviet.⁷⁸ The power of the judiciary, which might offer enforcement possibilities, remains weak despite the amendment preventing removal of the chairman of the Supreme Court by the president.

An important consideration in determining the actual power of the Supreme Soviet will be the government's willingness to adhere to the concept of constitutional accountability. In the past, this has not been a characteristic of Soviet regimes, but today Gorbachev and important figures like Shevardnadze are stressing this concept. The Ministry of Defense does not appear to be happy with legislative oversight, nor does it appear to be genuinely cooperative. Still, the Supreme Soviet has made inroads in oversight of the security policy apparatus that have affected the Defense Ministry in ways not to the military's liking.

Another important factor of legislative power is financial independence. Neither the CPD nor the Supreme Soviet has an independent budget. Instead, they are funded out of the state budget, which means the legislative organs must apply to the Council of Ministers for their own funding.⁷⁹ This situation presents a contradiction: How can the legislative organs provide effective oversight if they must obtain their funding from the ministries they oversee?

The problem of executive-legislative relations also limits legislative independence in the Soviet political system. With the intermingling of military officers, KGB, and military production officials as legislators on the DSSC, and parallel intermingling in other policy arenas throughout the Supreme Soviet and CPD, the Soviet legislative organs have a problem not experienced by the U.S. Congress. This situation—as well as the lack of full-time, professional legislators who do not devote time to other jobs—will limit Soviet legislative independence and effective oversight. The problems of the Soviet legislature also are complicated by the part-time legislators' inexperience—they are still struggling to define their roles and learning what to do.

Despite the many problems, the new Supreme Soviet has made concrete achievements in security policy during its short existence. Draft deferments for students pursuing higher education have resulted in the deferment or release of 176,000 young men from military service despite objections by the Ministry of Defense. Defense budget figures, regardless of questions of completeness and accuracy, represent improvements over past practice, when everything was secret. There is doubt if even the Soviet leadership knew the extent of the defense expenditures in the past. Laws governing military and security organs are being developed, thereby defining responsibilities and setting limits for their employment.⁸⁰

Ministerial appointments have been subject to intense scrutiny, and some candidates have been rejected. Questioning of Defense Minister Yazov and debate surrounding his appointment were extremely contentious, undoubtedly providing Yazov food for thought.⁸¹ That Gorbachev was able to secure Minister of Defense Yazov's confirmation despite this hostility brings up another issue. To date, the Supreme Soviet's actions seem to have been reflections of Gorbachev's will. The recent approval of constitutional amendments establishing a strong presidency, amending Article 6, and changing the property laws are examples of Gorbachev's capacity to manipulate the rules and procedures in pursuit of his objectives and to achieve those goals.

Thus, the lack of established procedure hinders the legislative organs' power to influence policy. However, procedural matters should be less of a problem as the system matures and the deputies have time to develop a plan of action. The 1994 election cycle will be critical because of the people's expectation of an increasingly democratic process. The development of non-CPSU party organizations occurring in the USSR today will facilitate this process. Opposition candidates and parties will have time to establish themselves, and even the next president will be popularly elected. Accountability to the voter will promote increased legislative independence from the Communist Party on the part of legislators. Development of legislative institutions and procedures for their operation should allow further expansion of legislative oversight of the national security decision-making process.

The survival and continued enhancement of the Supreme Soviet's influence seem likely, given the current leadership's goals. The new Executive Presidency, feared by many to be a return to authoritarianism, does not seem to offer the possibility of rule by one man. The constitutional "checks and balances" and separation of powers recently instituted provide effective limits to executive power—if they are not ignored.⁸²

Popular opinion is becoming a force to be reckoned with, presenting both impediments and support for the growth of legislative power. Despite the fact that much of the Soviet public supports the reform process, there is great divergence of opinion, which prevents the development of political consensus. Ethnic and cultural traditions of the myriad nationalities in the USSR are sources of many of the country's differences of political opinion. Paradoxically, the move toward democracy and pluralism has severely complicated the reform process by unleashing ethnic strife and providing an opportunity for many secession movements to develop.

As a result of the economic difficulties and ethnic strife partially caused by Gorbachev's reform program, there is a growing lack of confidence in the political leadership. The numerous national secession movements further endanger and complicate the reform process by threatening the integrity of the union. The public fears political disorder and economic crisis—seemingly distinct possibilities at this point. This lack of confidence makes it difficult to establish a democratic legislative process.

Thus, the Soviet political system currently does not appear to face a potent threat of return to Stalinism, but the turmoil in Soviet society may prevent the development of authority in the fledgling democratic system. As de Tocqueville noted, the most dangerous time for an authoritarian political system appears to be when it attempts to reform itself. Presently, Gorbachev's political survival does not appear to be essential for the continued development of legislative power in the Soviet Union. But the absence of a political consensus and lack of confidence in the political leadership threaten to limit the process of democratization.

The Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People's Deputies have yet to achieve the substantial power and influence of the U.S. Congress or that of any other major democratic parliament. However, the power of the U.S. Congress in the security policy arena took decades to evolve, and the history of its influence in this century has been one of decline and resurgence. The Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People's Deputies—which were created by authoritarian fiat—are beginning to develop an independent life of their own. Today, as the Communist Party and the military are losing power in the national security decision-making process, the power of the legislative organs seems certain to increase.

NOTES

1. This description is mainly taken from Peter Vanneman, *The Supreme Soviet: Politics and the Legislative Process in the Soviet Political System*, (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1977).
2. Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fainsod, *How the Soviet Union is Governed*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1979), p. 368.
3. Ibid., pp. 364-67.
4. Vanneman, pp. 37-45. The power of the former Supreme Soviet included:
 - the introduction and approval of legislation (introduction of legislation is a power shared with other governmental organs)
 - the selection of the government of the USSR, known as the Council of Ministers
 - the exclusive power to amend the Soviet Constitution
 - the election of the Presidium, Chairman, and commissions of the Supreme Soviet
 - budget, economic planning, and financial—including taxation—approval
 - supervision of the government apparatus and lower Soviets
 - (in the foreign affairs and national security arena) the power to represent the USSR in international relations; concludes, ratifies, and denounces treaties; decides questions of war and peace, organizes national defense and security; directs foreign trade on the basis of state monopoly.
5. Ibid., p. 13.
6. Hough and Fainsod, pp. 375-79. The role of the commissions was to examine preliminary drafts of legislation before sessions of the Supreme Soviet. Hough and Fainsod found the work of these commissions to be relatively insignificant. However, preparatory subgroups of the commissions, usually composed of deputies who served in the governmental ministries or party organs of competence parallel to the commission, were found to play a role in drafting legislation for consideration by the full commission

and the Supreme Soviet. The reliance on officials of the supervised ministries as members of the preparatory commissions severely limited independent legislative control over ministerial activity.

7. Vanneman, p. 14.
8. See Philip G. Roeder, "Modernization and Participation in the Leninist Development Strategy," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 83, no. 1, (January-March 1987), pp. 54-89. Roeder describes a system of pseudo-political participation fostered by the Soviet regime that forces "departicipation" in policy formulation, while demanding coproduction—that is, involvement in policy execution. The CPSU's elaborate use of elections is, to the Soviets, one example of Leninist Participation that attempts to enhance legitimacy through a façade of democracy and legality.
9. Vanneman, pp. 137-39.
10. Chingiz Aitmatov (May 25, 1989, Session of the CPD), Moscow Television Service, 1200 GMT, May 25, 1989, as translated in FBIS-SOV-89-102-S (May 30, 1989), p. 4. Aitmatov is an influential Soviet literary figure of Kirghiz extraction who is currently Supreme Soviet Chairman of the Council of Nationalities Commission on Development of Culture, Language, and Inter-ethnic Traditions, and Preservation of Historical Heritage. Aitmatov has also been selected as a member of Gorbachev's new Presidential Council.
11. Merle Fainsod, *How Russia is Ruled* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1953), p. 313.
12. Vanneman, p. 168.
13. Vanneman found the foreign affairs commissions of the Supreme Soviet had some small impact on foreign policy. The function of these committees was, first, as a final review board for checking the wording of treaties and laws in the foreign-affairs arena before their ratification by the superior bodies; and second, to serve in lieu of the higher bodies as a forum for propagating a policy by a high official. Vanneman also found that the foreign-affairs commissions were composed of high-ranking CPSU apparatchiki—to a much higher degree than the general membership of the Supreme Soviet. These commissions—one for each chamber of the Supreme Soviet—often met jointly. [Vanneman p. 171]

14. "Report of the International Affairs Committee to the Congress of People's Deputies," presented by Alexander Dzasokhov, Moscow Television Service, 1529 GMT, December 24, 1989, as translated in FBIS-SOV-89-248 (December 28, 1989), pp. 72-74.
15. Vanneman, pp. 86-87, notes that only two episodes of "unscheduled debate" have ever occurred in the history of the Supreme Soviet (prior to 1977). One of these instances was an unscheduled interruption of an academician's speech by Stalin. Adam B. Siegel, in "The Supreme Soviet: An Emerging Role in National Security Decision-Making," Preliminary Working Paper (Alexandria, Virginia: Center for Naval Analyses, November 28, 1989), p. 7, finds that there is no single recorded instance of dissent over national security issues ever voiced in the Supreme Soviet prior to 1989.
16. The ability of General Secretary Gorbachev to set and drive the agenda of political reform (at least at the highest level) is truly remarkable and demonstrates his power. Gorbachev's far-reaching power to influence the pace, extent, and impact of legislative reform is a matter to which I will return.
17. This information and most of my description of the current legislative organs is extracted from: Dawn Mann, Robert Monyak, and Elizabeth Teague, *The Supreme Soviet: A Biographical Directory* (Washington, D.C.: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1989), and numerous Radio Liberty/Radio Free Europe reports on the subject by these and other authors.
18. "USSR Law on Instituting the Post of President of the USSR and Making Amendments and Additions to the USSR Constitution (Fundamental Law)," *Izvestia*, March 16, 1990, Morning Edition, pp. 1-3, as translated in FBIS-SOV-90-052 (March 16, 1990), p. 47. The right to dismiss the president is part of the constitutional amendment package approved on March 14, 1990.
19. For more detail on the CPD structure, see Mann, Monyak, and Teague, pp. 6-7.
20. Mann, Monyak, and Teague, pp. 8-9.
21. "USSR Law on Instituting the Post of President . . .," (op.cit.), p. 50.
22. For an example of Gorbachev's use of the powers of Chairman, see David K. Shipler, "A Reporter at Large: Between Dictatorship and Anarchy," *The New Yorker*, June 25, 1990. Throughout the March 1990 session of the CPD, Gorbachev was able to effectively control the proceedings, achieving most of his goals regarding establishment of the Executive Presidency and the other constitutional amendments.

23. The new Executive Presidency and its Council were created in March 1990. Before the creation of this position, the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet was a much more significant position, acting as the head of state and chairman of the USSR Defense Council.
24. "USSR Law on Instituting the Post of President of the USSR and Making Amendments and Additions to the USSR Constitution (Fundamental Law)," *Izvestia*, March 16, 1990, Morning Edition, pp. 1-3, as translated in FBIS-SOV-90-052 (March 16, 1990), p. 47. The chairman of the Council of Ministers is next in line of succession.
25. Announcement by Moscow TASS in English, 2140 GMT, March 15, 1990, as reported in FBIS-SOV-90-052 (March 16, 1990), p. 74.
26. The composition of the Presidium was changed by the March 14, 1990, amendments to the Constitution. The number increased from 42 to 47. Formerly, the 15 republican representatives on the Presidium were the heads of respective republican Supreme Soviets.
27. The information in this section, unless otherwise noted, is taken from "USSR Law on Instituting the Post of President of the USSR and Making Amendments and Additions to the USSR Constitution (Fundamental Law)," *Izvestia*, March 16, 1990, Morning Edition, pp. 1-3, as translated in FBIS-SOV-90-052 (March 16, 1990), pp. 44-50.
28. Announcement by Moscow TASS in English, 0800 GMT, March 15, 1990, as reported in FBIS-SOV-90-051 (March 15, 1990), p. 44.
29. "USSR Law on Instituting the Post of President . . .," (op.cit.), The Constitutional amendments eliminate the provisions concerning the Defense Council. This important body was formerly headed by Gorbachev as Chairman of the Supreme Soviet. Currently, there is an ongoing investigation by Western analysts to determine the fate of the Defense Council and to identify its replacement if it has been eliminated. There is speculation that the newly instituted Presidential Council may be performing the functions of the Defense Council. See Alexander Rahr, "From Politburo to Presidential Council," *Report on the USSR*, vol. 2, no. 22 (June 1, 1990), pp. 1-6.
30. David K. Shipler, "A Reporter at Large: Between Dictatorship and Anarchy," *The New Yorker*, June 25, 1990, p. 55.
31. Alexander Rahr, "From Politburo to Presidential Council," *Report on the USSR*, vol. 2, no. 22 (June 1, 1990), p. 1.

32. My sources for the information in the section entitled "Foreign Policy, Defense Power," in *Guide to Congress*, 3rd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1982), pp. 287-337; and Wilfred L. Kohl, "Congressional Foreign Affairs Committees in the United States of America," ed. by Antonio Cassese, in *Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committees: The National Setting* (Vicenza, Italy: La Grafica & Stampa, 1982), pp. 285-313.
33. U.S. Code, Title 31, Chapter 1341, p. 392, (Public Law 97-258, September 13, 1982, 96 Stat. 923). This statute prohibits an officer or employee of the U.S. government from authorizing or making an expenditure or obligation exceeding the amount appropriated by Congress.
34. Kohl, p. 308. With the United States' emergence as a superpower involved in sustained efforts to "contain" the Soviet Union after World War II, the Congress became more interested in Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operations. The Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence were established in 1976 after Congressional dissatisfaction with CIA activities in Angola.
35. Kohl, p. 295.
36. Kohl, p. 296.
37. Ann L. Brownson, editor, *Congressional Staff Directory* 1989, vol. 1, (Mount Vernon, Virginia: Staff Directories, LTD., 1989, p. 434 and p. 451.
38. In this respect, the Soviet and American systems are similar, but not identical. The Soviet Constitution precludes the president from serving as a deputy (article 127). Ministers of the government are similarly restricted (See Dawn Mann and Julia Wishnevshy, "Composition of the People's Deputies," *Report on the USSR*, vol. 1, no. 18 [May 5, 1989], p. 2), but not so lesser ranking members of the government. Thus, there is an extensive and curious mixture of government officials serving as legislators. Article 123 of the constitution stipulates that members of the CPD and the Supreme Soviet are entitled to relief from their normal duties while performing as deputies. However, many of the deputies, such as the higher ranking members of the Defense Ministry, continue to perform both jobs. Whether this custom continues, or whether the legislature will become "professionalized" bears watching.
39. Dawn Mann, "Legislative Reform," *Report on the USSR*, vol. 1, no. 52 (December 29, 1989): p. 1.

40. Central Television, August 4, 1989, as quoted in Dawn Mann, "First Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet Ends," *Report on the USSR*, vol. 1, no. 33 (August 18, 1989): p. 1.
41. For an excellent account of the debate over the amendments regarding the new presidency, see Dawn Mann, "Gorbachev Sworn in as President," *Report on the USSR*, vol. 2, no. 12 (March 23, 1990), pp. 1-4. As for information on the significance and power of the presidency, see Elizabeth Teague, "The Powers of the Soviet Presidency," pp. 4-7, in the same issue.

According to these articles, there was considerable opposition to several aspects of the presidency as originally proposed. Concessions that reduced the powers of the position were necessary to gain approval of the amendments. Gorbachev won the election with 1,329 votes in a single candidate ballot, just 206 more than required to win. Of the 2,245 members of the CPD, 2,000 collected their ballots for the election; 245 either did not attend or boycotted the election; 122 ballots were not returned or declared invalid, and 495 deputies voted against Gorbachev. Gorbachev ran unopposed. Significant also is the fact that the decision to have the CPD elect the first president rather than having him popularly elected passed by a narrow margin—1,542 deputies, just 45 more than the required number. These votes indicate that the Soviet legislature has the potential to become more than just an extension of Gorbachev's will.

42. *Argumenty i fakti*, [Untitled statistical report on the composition of the Supreme Soviet], January 27, 1990, as translated in FBIS-SOV-90-26 (February 7, 1990), p. 71.
43. Mann, Monyak, and Teague, pp. 23-28. Current rules call for a turnover of 20 percent annually. The replacements will be selected from the CPD. The turnover, and the development of the selection process, bears watching.
44. Dawn Mann, "The USSR Constitution: The Electoral System," *Report on the USSR*, vol. 1, no. 33 (February 2, 1990), p. 11. Before the March 1990 amendments, there was a special constitutional committee working on a new constitution, presumably addressing these and other changes. The work of this committee has been disrupted by the major changes to the Constitution that occurred in March.
45. See, for example, articles on this topic in the *The New York Times*, August 14, 1989, and *The Washington Post*, August 9 and 14, 1989.
46. Reuters, USIS, September 1, 1989, as cited in *Report on the USSR*, vol. 1, no. 36, September 8, 1989, p. 47.

47. Jeffery Legro, *Trip Report: Admiral Crowe's Visit to the Soviet Union* (Santa Monica, California: Rand/UCLA Center for Soviet Studies, March 1990).
48. For a positive Soviet review of the DSSC's early months, see G. Sturua, "*Komitet po Voprosam Oboriny i Gosudarstvennoi Besopastnosti: Pervye Mesyatsy Raboty*," *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnie Otnoshenie* (January 1990), p. 82.

Other Western reviews have been mixed. For a generally positive assessment, see C. G. Jacobsen (of Carlton University, Ottawa), "Changes in Soviet Defense Decision-Making," *International Defense Review* (February 1990): pp. 128-29; and Report on the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, "The New Soviet Legislature: Committee on Defense and State Security," U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., April 11, 1990.

A more critical review is provided by Mikhail Tsypkin, "The Committee for Defense and State Security of the USSR Supreme Soviet," *Report on the USSR*, vol. 2, no. 19 (May 11, 1990), pp. 8-11. Tsypkin finds the DSSC to be conservative and, in general, dominated by members of the Soviet military-industrial complex who have a vested interest in protecting the security policy status quo.

49. G. Sturua, p. 82. and "*Komitety Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR i postoyannye komissii Soveta Soyuzov i Sovet National'nostei*," *Izvestia*, July 13, 1989. p. 5.
50. S. Taranov, "*Glasnost' i gosudarstvennaya bezopasnost'*," *Izvestia*, (Lapygin Interview), June 27, 1989, as translated in FBIS-SOV-89-124 (June 29, 1989), p. 43.
51. U.S. Congress, Report of the Committee on Armed Services, op. cit., p.5.
52. V. Losarev, "Parliament Continues Its Work," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, June 29, 1989, p. 3, as translated in FBIS-SOV-89-124 (June 29, 1989), p. 42.
53. S. Taranov, (op. cit.) p. 43.
54. "Defense Budget Under Examination," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, October 6, 1989, p. 1, as translated in FBIS-SOV-89-194 (October 10, 1989), p. 56, and (Interview with Vladimir Lapygin, and Les Aspin), *Moscow News*, no. 36 (September 10-17, 1989), p. 6.
55. Tsypkin, p. 9.
56. Report on the Committee on Armed Services, pp. 5-6.

57. *Izvestia*, July 13, 1989, p. 5.
58. Jacobsen, p. 130. This appraisal appears optimistic. To my knowledge, the Soviet defense budget information remains incomplete despite the publication of more data in 1989 and 1990. See, for example, Yuri Ryzhov, "The Security We Do Not Need," *New Times*, no. 10 (March 6-12, 1990), p. 27: "We, members of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, still have no clue as to how the military budget is distributed among the ministries, or what our major military programs are, of how they conform to the principles of defense sufficiency."
59. Jacobsen, p. 130.
60. Georgii Arbatov, "Armiya dlya strany ili strana dlya armii?" *Ogonek*, no. 5, 1990, p. 4.
61. Report of the Committee on Armed Services, p. 6.
62. Marat Abullayev, "Deputies and Congressmen," *Soyuz*, no. 5 (January 29, 1989—February 4, 1990), p. 12, as translated in JPRS-UPA-90-014 (March 23, 1990), pp. 1-3.
63. Report of the Committee on Armed Services, p. 7.
64. Sturua, pp. 84-85.
65. Moscow Domestic Service (Interview with S. P. Golovin), in Russian, at 0900 GMT, October 6, 1989, as translated in FBIS-SOV-89-194 (October 10, 1989), p. 55.
66. Jeffery Legro, *Trip Report: Admiral Crowe's Visit to the Soviet Union* (Santa Monica, California: Rand/UCLA Center for Soviet Studies, March 1990), p. 4. Legro also indicated that the committee's questioning of Admiral Crowe was polite and not particularly focused, with "little bite." If treatment of their own military officials is similar, it would appear the committee has a long way to go to match the aggressiveness of its American counterpart and to establish effective oversight.
67. Report of the Committee on Armed Services, pp. 8-12.
68. The collegium of the Defense Ministry recently endorsed a law on defense and plans (April 29, 1990) to submit it to the Supreme Soviet for consideration. An attempt is made for the first time to "lay down the fundamentals of the legal status of the Armed Forces and to define such notions as the state of war, war time, mobilization, martial law, and civil and territorial defense. Some of these provisions were regulated

previously but only by secret decrees of the defense minister or by decrees of the USSR Council of Ministers." [Moscow TASS, in English, 1242 GMT, April 29, 1990, as reported in FBIS-SOV-90-083 (April 30, 1990), p. 83. *Krasnaya Zvezda*, April 29, 1990, p. 2, provides more specific information as to the provisions of the defense bill.

69. Report of the Committee on Armed Services, p. 9.
70. Legro, p. 4.
71. Stephen Foye, "Radical Military Reform and the 'Young Turks', *Report on the USSR*, vol. 2, no. 15 (April 13, 1990), pp. 8-10. The article reports a joke making the rounds recently in the Soviet Union: "What is the highest rank in the armed forces today?" The answer: "A people's deputy." This joke seems to indicate that perhaps the Soviet legislative organs are beginning to gain power and authority relative to the security organs. The group of 'Young Turks' consists of 20 uniformed deputies, including Major Vladimir Lopatin. Lopatin's actions have caused much consternation among the more conservative members of the Defense Ministry and officer corps. Lopatin's local CPSU organization expelled him from the party April 26, 1990. (*Izvestia*, April 30, 1990, p. 3.) Lopatin, a political officer, was later reinstated, pending further investigation, by the CPSU Central Committee Party Control Committee after an appeal by Lopatin. The charges against him were determined to be unjustified. *Vremya* newscast, Moscow Television Service, 1445 GMT, May 8, 1990, as translated in FBIS-SOV-90-090 (May 9, 1990), p. 54.
72. My figure of 13 is reached by comparing the list of committee members and their professions and current employment as published in *Izvestia*, (Staff or the IAC), July 13, 1989, p. 5, and the more extensive biographical data on Supreme Soviet members (22 Supreme Soviet deputies of 43 IAC members), as contained in Mann, Monyak, and Teague. Of those 22, I could identify only four with foreign policy expertise.
73. *Izvestia*, June 21, 1989, as translated in FBIS-SOV-89-119 (June 22, 1989), p. 45.
74. USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *The Foreign Policy and Diplomatic Activity of the USSR; April 1985—October 1989*, published in *International Affairs*, January 1990, p. 109.
75. *Izvestia*, March 22, 1989, (Interview with the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs), as translated and condensed in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. xli, no. 13 (April 30, 1989), p. 19.


76. "Foreign Affairs in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR," *International Affairs*, no. 10, 1989, pp. 14-33.
77. Shipler, pp. 42-70. This is a very interesting behind-the-scenes account of the approval of the March 1990 Constitutional amendments.
78. Shipler, p. 49.
79. Report of the Committee on Armed Services, p. 8.
80. (Editorial Report), Moscow Television Service, 2007 GMT March 27, 1990, as translated in FBIS-SOV-90-060 (March 28, 1990), p. 43. A law governing the duties and rights of the internal troops of the MVD in maintaining public order was adopted.
81. For an account of Yazov's confirmation hearing before the Supreme Soviet, during which he received more than 400 questions and significant criticism, see (Speech by USSR Defense Minister Yazov), Moscow Domestic Service, 1400 GMT, July 3, 1989, as translated in FBIS-SOV-89-127 (July 5, 1989), pp. 40-62.
82. See Albert L. Weeks, "The Limits on Gorbachev's Power," *Christian Science Monitor*, April 3, 1990, p. 19. Weeks provides an analysis of the constitutional balance of powers and the potential of return to authoritarianism. He concludes that, while Gorbachev's tenure may be shaky over the next five years, pluralism and democracy will flourish.

APPENDIX A

**ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE
OF THE PRE-1988 SUPREME SOVIET**

APPENDIX A

ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE OF THE PRE-1988 SUPREME SOVIET¹



THE SUPREME SOVIET IN THE SOVIET CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER

Source: V. Aspaturian (1972) "The Soviet Constitutional Order," in *Modern Political Systems: Europe*, R. C. Macridis and R. E. Ward (eds.) 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall), as modified by author


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Figure A.

1. As reproduced in Peter Vanneman, *The Supreme Soviet: Politics and the Legislative Process* (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1977), p. 12.

APPENDIX B

ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE OF THE SUPREME SOVIET



SOURCE: Dawn, Robert Monyak, and Elizabeth Teague, The Supreme Soviet: A Biographical Directory (Washington, D. C.: RL/RFE and CSIC, 1989), pp. 38-39, as modified by the author to reflect changes based on March 1990 Constitutional Amendments

UNCLASSIFIED

Figure B.

APPENDIX C

**JOINT COMMITTEES AND COMMISSIONS
OF THE SUPREME SOVIET**

APPENDIX C

JOINT COMMITTEES AND COMMISSIONS OF THE SUPREME SOVIET

Joint Committees are composed of members of both the Supreme Soviet Council of the Union and the Council of the Soviet. Fifty percent of the committee and commission membership is also drawn from the membership of the Congress of People's Deputies not selected to the Supreme Soviet. Joint committees often have subcommittees that address more specific topics.

SUPREME SOVIET COMMITTEES

Agrarian and Food Committee	Legislation, Legality, and Law and Order Committee
Construction and Architecture Committee	Science, Education, Culture and Upbringing Committee
Defense and State Security Committee	Soviet of People's Deputies Management and Self-Management Development Committee
Ecology and the Rational Use of Natural Resources Committee	Veteran and Invalid Affairs Committee
Economic Reform Committee	Women's Affairs and Family and Child Protection Committee
Glasnost and Citizens' Rights Committee	Youth Affairs Committee
Health Committee	
International Affairs Committee	

SUPREME SOVIET COMMITTEES (Continued)

Commissions of the Council of the Union

**Industry, Energy, Machinery, and
Technology Development Commission**

**Labor, Prices, and Social
Policy Commission**

**Planning, Budget, and Finance
Commission**

**Transportation, Communications,
and Information Technology
Commission**

Commissions of the Council of Nationalities

**Consumer Goods, Trade, and Municipal,
Consumer, and other Services Commission**

**Culture, Language, National and
International Traditions of Historical
Heritage Commission**

**Nationalities Policy and Inter-ethnic
Relations Commission**

**Social and Economic Development of
Union and Autonomous Republics,
Oblasts, and Okrugs Commission**

APPENDIX D

**MEMBERS OF THE DEFENSE AND STATE SECURITY
COMMITTEE OF THE SUPREME SOVIET**

APPENDIX D

MEMBERS OF THE DEFENSE AND STATE SECURITY COMMITTEE OF THE SUPREME SOVIET¹

Chairman Lapygin, Vladimir L. (chief designer and director, Moscow automation plant)

Deputy Chairman Ochirov, Valery, Colonel (student, Voroshilov General Staff Academy)

Akhromeyev, Sergei, Marshal (adviser to President Gorbachev)

Baluyev, Veniamin (chairman, Belorussian Republic KGB)

Belyakov, Oleg S. (chief, Defense Department, CPSU Central Committee)

Biryukov, Vitalii, secretary of the DSSC (mechanic, metallurgical factory)

Boztayev, Keshrim (first secretary, Semipalatinsk Obkom)

Britvin, Nikolai (chief, KGB Border Guards Political Directorate)

Bykov, Vasily (secretary, USSR Union of Writers)

Chizhov, Anatolii A. (director, "Progress" aerospace plant)

Garponvo-Grekhov, Andrei (director, Academy of Sciences Applied Physics Institute)

Golovin, Stanislav (radio apparatus tuner, machine-building plant)

Gorelovskii, Ivan (chairman, Azerbaijan Republic KGB)

Isayev, Yuroy (director, production association)

Ivanov, Vitalii, Admiral (commander, Baltic Fleet)

1. Source: Composition of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Committee on Questions of Defense and State Security, *Izvestia*, July 13, 1989, p. 5.

Kharchenko, Grigorii (first secretary, Zaporozhye Obkom)

Klautsen, Arnold (first secretary, Riga Gorkom)

Kolbeshkin, Aleksey (team leader, production association)

Kucherskii, Nikolai (director, mining and metallurgy combine)

Laurinkus, Mechis (scientist, Philosophy Institute, Lithuania)

Lukin, Vladimir (cutter, diesel engine building plant)

Nemtsev, Yevgeniy (team leader, production association)

Nikitin, Rudolph (director, production association)

Novozhilov, Henrikh (director and general designer, Ilyushin Aircraft Design Bureau)

Opolinskii, Vladimir A. (foreman, shipyard)

Podziruk, Viktor, Lt. Col. (instructor, military unit)

Ryumin, Valerii (deputy chief designer, production association)

Samsonov, Yurii (first secretary, Uluanovsk Obkom)

Shabanov, Vitalii, General, (deputy minister of defense)

Sharin, Leonid (first secretary, Amur Obkom)

Sharipov, Yurii (director, production association)

Simonov, Mikhail (director, machine-building plant)

Spasskii, Igor D. (chief designer and director, Marine Technology Bureau)

Talanchuk, Peter (rector, Kiev Polytechnical Institute)

Tsyplyayev, Sergi A., Secretary of the DSSC (secretary, State Optical Institute)

Tutov, Nikolai, Senior Lt. (co-chairman, Socialist Democratic Association)

Tuzov, Vladimir (chairman, Radion and Electronic Workers Union)

Utkin, Vladimir (director, production association)

Vare, Vello (staff worker, Estonian Academy of Scientific History Institute)

Velikhov, Evgenii (vice president, Academy of Sciences; director, Kurchatov
Institute of Atomic Energy; Gorbachev's chief science adviser)

Volskii, Arkadii (Central Committee official)

Yefimov, Anatolii (second secretary, Communist Party, Uzbekistan)

Zokirov, Munavarkhon (chief, DOSAFF sports club)

APPENDIX E

**MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
COMMITTEE OF THE SUPREME SOVIET**

APPENDIX E

MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE OF THE SUPREME SOVIET¹

Chairman Alexander S. Dzasokhov (first secretary, North Osetinsk Obkom)

Amaglobeli, Nodari S. (rector, Tbilisi State University)

Ananyev, Anatoli A. (writer, chief editor of "October" magazine)

Arbatov, Georgii A. (academician, director, Institute for the Study of the U.S. and Canada)

Bikkenin, Nail B. (chief editor, "Kommunist" magazine)

Borovik, Henrik A. (writer, political observer, State Television and Radio Committee)

Bratun, Rostislav A. (writer)

Burlatiskii, Fedor M. (political observer, "Literary Gazette")

Chekuolis, Algimantis Yu. (chief editor of the Lithuanian daily, "Gimtasis Krashtas")

Chernyaev, Anatolii S. (assistant to the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee)

Chervonopskii, Sergei V. (first secretary, Cherkasskogo Gorkom)

Falin, Valentin M. (chief of the International Affairs Committee of the CPSU Central Committee)

1. Source: Composition of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR International Affairs Committee *Izvestia*, July 13, 1989, p. 2.

Goldanskii, Vitalii I. (director, Institute of Chemical Physics, Academy of Sciences)
Kanoatov, Muminsho (writer, first secretary of the Board of the Tadzhikistan
Republic Union of Writers)

Kapitsa, Mikhail S. (director, Institute of Eastern Studies, Academy of Sciences)

Karpov, Vladimir V. (writer, first secretary of Board of the USSR Union of Writers)

Kafarova, Elmira M. (chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the
Republic of Azerbaidzhan)

Kim, Yen Un (senior scientific worker of the Olmsk State University)

Kostishin, Nikolai A. (mechanic-assembler)

Kravets, Vladimir A. (foreign minister of the Ukrainian Republic)

Kudarauskas, Sigitas Io. (managing chair of the electronic-technical disciplines
faculty of the Kaunasskii Polytechnical Institute)

Laptev, Ivan D. (chief editor, "Izvestia" newspaper)

Lobov, Vladimir N. (general of the Army, first deputy chief of staff of the
Soviet Armed Forces)

Luchinskii, Peter K. (second secretary, Tadzhikistan Communist Party Central
Committee)

Lychenok, Igor M. (president of the Board of the Composers' Union)

Mazyrov, Cyril T. (president of the All-Union Committee of War and Labor)

Maltsev, Yevgenii D. (deputy chairman, Leningrad Board of the Union of Artists
of the RSFSR)

Maslin, Vladimir P. (first deputy chairman of the Board of the Soviet Fund
for Peace)

Moshnyaga, Timofei V. (chief doctor, clinical hospital)

Mukhametzyanov, Aklim K. (general director, Petroleum Production Association)

Neilander, Nikolai V. (deputy minister of foreign affairs of Latvia)

Nikanorov, Igor A. (lathe operator)

Orozova, Umtyl Sh. (chairman, Kirghiz Television and Radio Committee)

Sagdeev, Roald Z. (academician, director Scientific-Methodological Center
for Analytic Investigation of Space)

Safieva, Gulrukhsor (chairman, Tadzhikistan Department of the Soviet Cultural
Fund)

Sorokin, Alekei I. (first deputy chief of the Main Political Administration of the
Armed Forces)

Tabeev, Fikryat A. (first deputy chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers)

Tereshkova, Valentina V. (chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Society of
Friendship and Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries)

Vulfson, Mavrik G. (senior instructor of social science, Latvian Academy of Arts)

Yanaev, Gennadi I. (secretary, All-Union Council of Trade Unions)

Yetlylen, Vladimir, M. (Ph.D. candidate of Social Sciences)

Yusunov, Erkin Yu. (vice president, Uzbekistan Academy of Sciences)